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I  am  to  speak  to  you  on  the  achievements  and  prospects  of the  E~S at  the  end 
of its first  five  years.  I  will  concentrate  on  three main  qestions: 
- firs~ to  what  extent has  the  EMS  achieved  the  objectives  initially  set  for 
it? 
- secon~  what  deqree  of  flexi~ility has  it  been  able  to  rlemonstrate? 
- thir<; what  developments  may,  in the  normal  course  of events,  be  expected at 
this  stage? 
* 
*  * 
1.  The  EMS  was  set up  in March  1979  in  a  well  thought-out political move: 
(a)  Although  a  mini-snake still existed,  it was  becoming  increasingly clear 
that  the  floating  of  currencies  threatened  all  that  had  been  achieved  so  far 
in  the  Community.  There  was  a  need  to  establish  a  nore  stable  mo:-tet ary 
framework  for  the  Community  and  to  restore  coherence  and  predictability to  the 
Community  economy. 
(b)  In  strictly  monetary  terms,  the .objective  was  more  far-reaching:  the 
European  zone  of  stability  was  to  contribute  to  a  satisfactory  international 
trend  and  to  help  create the  conditions  for  a  dialogue  between  major  monetary 
areas. 
(c)  Lastly,  over  and  above  the  achievement  of integration  through  the  market, 
a  first  step  was  to  be  taken  towards  a  more  fundamental  union  involving  the 
political  decision-making  centres. 
the  tradition  in  European  affairs. 
The  approach  was  more  pragmatic  than  is 
The  Member  States  and  their central  banks 
concluded  mainly  gentleman's  agreements,  taking  good  care  to  lay  the basis  for 
success  by  building  economic  requirements  into  the  monetary  arrangements  and 
by  basing action  on: 
- first,a rigorous  but  flexible  exchange  rate  mechanism  protected  by  powerful 
credit facilities; 
- second,  a  more  resolute  attempt  than  was  the  case  with  the  snake  to  achieve 
convergence,  which  was  clearly recognized  as  a  necessary  conditi.on of success. 
Parity  changes  were  to  be  used  only  as  a  last resort,  and  waul~ t\erefore - 2  -
either  have  to  be  avoided  through  prior  adjustment  of  economic  policies  or 
would  have  to  be  accompanied  by  a  package  of  economic  measures  designed  to 
ensure  that  the  parity  changes  had  their desired effect; 
- and,  third,  further  development  of the  system  through  instruments  (the  ECU) 
or  institutions  {the  Monetary  Fund)  that  would  fully  establish  Europe's 
monetary  identity. 
At  the  end  of its first five  years,  the general  ourpose  of  the  European 
rronetary  system· renains  valid;  the  Conmunity  now  enjoys ·relative nonetary 
stability,  and  a  contribution  can  be  made  at  the  appropriate tine  to gradually 
creating  the  basic  conditions  for  an  international  monetary  system  marked  by 
greater  stability and  more  balanced  exchange  rate  relationships. 
Experience  with  the operation  of the  system  must  be  assessed  in  the  light  of 
the  results  achieved  in  pursuing  its  three  fundamental  objectives 
stabilizing exchange  rates,  improving  economic  policy  convergence  and  agreeing 
on  an  exchange  rate policy vis-a-vis  the  rest of the  world. 
- The  system  has  made  a  remarkable  contribution  to  ensuring  exchange  rate 
stability.  During  the  last  five  years,  the  volatility  of  exchange  rates 
within  the  Community  has  been  contained  within  limits  which  are  in  sharp 
contrast with  the  scale  of fluctuations  of the  dolla~~  the  yen  and  even,  to 
some  extent,  sterling.  The  relationships  between  the  exchange  rates  of the 
currencies  participating  in  the  exchange  rate  mechanism  have  essentially 
remained  satisfactory in  economic  terms. 
A  few  figures  will  illustrate  this:  taking  the  short-term  volatility  of 
nominal  exchange  rates,  the  monthly  variability  of  the  French  franc,  the 
Italian lira,  the  Dutch guilder  and  the Belgian  franc  against  the  German  mark 
ranged  between  0.5%  and  0.8%  in  the  period  from  1979  to  1983,  whereas  during 
the  same  period their monthly variability against  the  dollar,  the  yen  and  even 
sterling was  between  2.4%  and  2.7%.  The  results  are  just as  conclusive if one 
looks at the  variability of real  exchange  rates. 
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What  is  more,  the  adjustments  made  during  the  period  broadly  offset  the 
differences  in  inflation,  and  the  relationships  between  real  exchange  rates 
remained  much  more  balanced  within  the  EMS  than  bet\veen  the  other  major 
currencies. 
The  results  point  to  fairly  satisfactory  progress  on  monetary  stability; 
moreover,  businessmen  and  consumers  have  had  greater certainty  about  what  to 
expect  in  the  future  and  have  been  able  to  rely  on  exchange  rates  that  arc 
sufficiently  in  line  with  economic  fundamentals.  Without 
doubt,  this  sort  of  situation  holds  protectionist  forces  at  bay  and 
consolidates  the  continental-sized  market  which  is  Europe's  present  and 
potential strength. 
- The  EMS  has  also  considerably  strengthened  convergence  within  the  Community. 
The  most  usual  way  of  demonstrating  this  is  by  looking  at  the  convergence  of 
economic  trends,  particularly well  illustrated by  the  oerformance  on  inflation: 
the  average  rate  of  price  increases  in  the  EMS  countries  was  9.3%  in  the 
period  from  1979  to  1981,  \'lith  the  standard deviation  being  5.4%;  by  1983,  the 
rate  had  been  reduced  to  7.6%,  with  the  standard  deviation  dovm  to 2.7%.  The 
operation  of  EMS  has  thus  been  accompanied  by  a  narrQwing  in  the 
dispersion  of  inflation  rates  and  at  the  same  time  by  a  significant slowdown 
in  inflation. 
The  fact  that  the  Member  States  have  to  assess  jointly  the  consequences  of 
their  major  economic  decisions  has  led  to  considerable  strengthening  of 
consultation  procedures,  i.e.  more  effective coordination,  and  has  enhanced 
the  roles of the Monetary  Committee  and  the  Committee  of Governors.  This  has 
made  for  growing  convergence  in  economic  analyses  and  economic  thinking  ... ;i thin 
the  Community. - 4  -
Furthernore,  and  this  is  a  point  I  ~auld like  to  emphasize,  during periods  of 
crisis the existence of  the  EMS  has  pl~yed  an  important  and  pel'hnps  cruciaJ 
role  in  the  devising  of  strict  adjustment  policies.  The  El\lS  has  perhaps 
enabled  Europe  to  avoid  the  danger  of  breaking  up  as  a  result of  recourse  to 
competitive  de  facto  devaluations  or  to  t  t ·  ·  t  _____  pro  ec ·lonls  measures,  or  quite 
simply because  of the  clash of conflicting policies. 
The  results  achieved  in  coordinat  ·  h  t  1·  '  lng  exc  ange  ra  e  po  lCies  vis-a-vis 
non-Community  currencies  have  been  more  disappointing,  which  is  not 
surprising,  since  the  main  thing here  is  the  form  and  extent of  the  dialogue 
with  the  major  monetary  areas. 
Floating is very  far  from  having  brought  the  degree  of stability and  alignment 
with  economic  fundamentals  that  was  expected  of  it.  The  real  effective 
exchange  rate  of  the  dollar  has  varied  considerably  in  both  directions  since 
1970.  If we  take  1970  as  a  base,  the  average  real  effective  exchange 
rate  of  the  dollar  had  fallen  by  33%  in  1975;  in  1980,  it was  40%  below its 
1970  level,  while  in  1983  it was  only  13%  belo~ that  level.  Whatever  the 
reasons  for  such  movements,  they  inevitably  have  a  very  marked  effect  on  the 
allocation  of resources  in  the  world  economy,  r.1ake  for  financial  instability 
and  increase protectionist pressures. 
Such  variations  can  create  severe  strains  within  the  EMS  becat..:se  of  the 
reserve  currency status of the  German  mark,  which  is  in  the  front  line  against 
the  dollar.  Strengthening  the  internal  coordination  of  exchange  rate 
policies,  participating  actively  in  the  current discussions  on  international 
monetary  questions  and  speaking  with  a  single  voice  in  such  discussions,  and 
improving  the  dialogue  with  the  United  States  and  Japan  - these  are  the  main 
lines  along  which  action  should  be  taken.  I  \Oiill  come  back  to  this  in  a 
moment.  But  let me  first remind  you  that  in  December  1980,  at  a  conference 
organized  by  the Financial  Times  in  Amsterdam,  I  emphasized  the  dangers  of an 
international  exchange  rate  system  in  which  there  was  an  undue  tendency  for 
exchange  rates  to get out  of line with  basic  trends.  As  a  remedy,  I  proposed 
that  relationships  between  the  dollar,  the  yen  and  the  ECU  should,  without 
excessive  rigidity,  be  maintained  within  "zones  of ;:>lausibility"  1)  that 
corresponded  to  economic,  commercial  and  monetary  realities  in  the  United 
States,  Japan  and  the  Community,  which  meant  recognizing  a  risk and  organizing 
ourselves flexibly  to  deal  with it together. 
-~ 
(1)  The  French  expression  is  'zonesde  vraisemblance' 
X These  rensonably  sat  is  foe tol'Y  conclusions  regording  the  internal 
2.  '  . t  . s  remembered  that  the  &;'.cncral 
b ·ectivcs  arc  all  the  more  encO\.n'aging ..Jolen  1  .  1  , 
0  J  '  b  ld venture. 
d  .  to  the  succe<>s  of  sue,,  a  o  -
After  a11, 
context was  not  con  uc1 ve  . 
.  k"ng  to  restore relative  exchange-rate stability. 
Europe  was  alone  1n  see  1 
in  the  crude  oil  price  agoin  called  for 
(i)  Although  the  1978-79 
d  World  _  under  conditions 
t  ·  relation  to  the  outsi  e 
increases 
major  real  adjustmen  s  1n 
which  varied  widely  from  one  country  to  another  -
since  the  Community's  net 
oil bill  increased  from  2. 5%  of  GDP  in 
member  countries  participating  in  the 
competitive  devaluations. 
1978  to  4.1% 
exchange-rate 
in  1981, 
mechanism 
none  of  the 
resorted  to 
( ii)  What  is  even 
more  remarkable  is  that  the  scheme  has  also  withstood  the 
1 .  In  ¥.arch  1979,  the  launching of  the 
dollar  shock  which  I  referred  to  ear 1er. 
1 
scheme  was  helped  by  the  decision  taken  in  November  1978  by  the  United States 
b  f  t  l  bar1ks  not,bly  those  in  in  agreement  with  a  num  er  o  cen ra  ,  - authorities, 
1 .  f  ·  t  ent·on  on  fore1"gn  exchange  markets.  Europe  to  pursue  a  po  1cy  o  1n  erv  1 
Despite  the  strains  resulting  from  the  radical  change  in  Anerican  monetary 
oolicy  since  then,  Eurocean  cooperation  has  held,  demonstrating  the  system's 
technical  capacity  and  its underlying  political  vigour. 
(iii) Finally,  the  EMS  has  survived the  1980-82  recession.  Initial situations 
and  adjustment  needs  were  different.  Policies have  converged  only gradually. 
Through  adjustments  which  are still admittedly  too  frequent,  the  El<1S  has  grmo:n 
stronger  (I  am  thinking of  the  discipline  it imposes)  and  its  objectives  have 
been  respected. 
(iv)  I  will  conclude  this  brief  assessment  by  pointing  to  a  relatively 
unexpected  development  arising  from  the  setting  up  of  the  EMS:  whereas  the 
public  use  of  the  ECU  has  remained  fairly  strictly  circumscribed  by  the 
provisions  initially  laid  down,  the  private  ECU  has sprearl  very  quickly  on 
public  markets  and  has  demonstrated  great  adaptive  capacity.  A  nurr.ber  of 
United  Kingdom  banks  have  taken  an  active  part  in  this  rapid  development.  The 
ECU  market  developed  first  (1979-81)  in  the  form  of  roll-over  credits 
renewable  every  three  months  and  granted  by  private  banks.  International  loan 
issues1  denominated  in  ECU  then  steadily increased,  beginning  in  April  1981: 
1 
Excluding  Italian Government  issues  on  the  Italian market. - 6  -
these  issues  exceeded  300  millior1  ECU  1.11  1981,  h  d  1 
- reac  c  980  million  ECU  in 
1982  and  topped  2  000  million  ECU  in  1983. 
Within  three  years,  the  fCU  hCJ.s 
therefore  established  itself  in  third  place, 
German  mark,  in  the  league 
after  the  dollar  and  the 
table.  of  international  bond  ·  lSSUes,  and 
the  markets. 
international  ECU  bonds  totalling  4  000  million  ECU  are  now 
1·n  ·  1  t· 
Cll'CU  a  l on  O!i. 
This  growth  in  the  use  of  the  ECLJ  on  international  fin<lnci::ll 
markets  - even  if helped  by  the  fact  thCJt  the  Community  institutions'  issues 
accounted  for  some  30%  of  the  total  at  the  end  of  1983  - is  very  largely  a 
spontaneous  phenomenon. 
While  much  has  therefore  been  achieved  to  date,  further progress  can  and  must 
still  be  made.  Monetary  stability  has  improved  but  is  still  imperfect, 
convergence  is  insufficient  and  international  monetary stability has  yet  to  be 
achieved. 
What  is  more,  the  political  rationale  of  the  EMS  is  still  there:  to 
demonstrate  both  internally  and  externally that  we  still  have  the  \\ i ll  and 
political  a~ility to  com~lete the  ~uildin1 of  the  Conmunity,  to  use  Euro8e's 
strength  to  overcome  the  crisis  and  to  continue  the  progress  towards  a  co~~on 
market  truly  without  frontiers  and  obstacles. 
We  cannot  yet  move  to  the  so-called  "institutional"  phase  (which  involves  the 
setting up  of a  European  Monetary  Fund  having  some  of the  characteristics of a 
central  bank).  But  the  system  can  be  consolidated  and  developed  rationally on 
a  fairly  broad  front. 
0 
0  0 
3.  The  EMS  can  be  developed  in  four  ways 
- by  consolidating the  system  internally; 
·d  t"t  in  the  world;  - by  reinforcing Europe's  monetary  1  en  l  Y 
- by  strengthening the  public  and  private roles of the  ECU;  and 
t o  the  process  of  financial  integration  - by  giving  a  fresh  impetus 
Community. 
in  the - ?  -
3.1  . d  t ·  tlle  ~~rs_  tern  internally  Consoll  n  1ng  "'-
told  you  about  what  m<tkes  the  . l  Th  re  1. s  scope  for  system  frag1  e ·  e  -
I  have 
because  difficulties still 
Thl ·s  scope  must  be  used:  technically,  improvement. 
because  the  EMS  is  the  one  bold  step  which  and  politically, 
the 
exist; 
thus  demonstrate  to business  and  to  Community  has  taken  in  ten years·  \tie  \•iOuld 
financial  markets  both  within  and  outside  Europe  that  we  are  prepared  to  use 
to  Overcome  the  crisis  and  to  lend  all  our  weight  to  the  European  dimension 
d  t  relations  in  the  world.  help establish more  satisfactory economic  an  1.1one  ary 
The  system should be  consolidated  in three  ways: 
(i)  By  reinforcing the  system  technica1ly 
Wider  acceptance  of the  ECU  in  dealings  between  central  banks  - facilitated by 
better remuneration  - is within  our  reach. 
(ii)  By  achieving  increased  convergence  through greater  discipline 
I  have  already  indicated  what  progress  has  been  made:  it is reflected  in  the 
growing  convergence  of analyses  and  thinking which  I  have  mentioned;  in  active 
and  increasingly  syste1.1atic  cooperation  within  the  Monetary  Committee  and  the 
Committee  of Governors  of the  Central  Banks;  in the  discipline  imposed  by 
crises  within  the  system,  with  the  establishment  of  back-up  programmes  when 
adjustments  are  made;  and  in the  conditionality of the  Community's  balance of 
payments  assistance.  But  increasing  diverqence  still  cannot  be  excluded. 
The  system  is  constructed  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  only  partially  binding. 
This  will  remain  true  until  such  time  as  there  is  a  transfer  of  responsibiLity 
to  the  Community.  The  immediate  prospect  before  us  is therefore  one  of  an 
imperfect  coordinating  mechanism,  the  sole  day-to-day  bindin3  element  of  which 
is  the  observance  of  declared parities. - 8  -
What  we  might  realistic<'l.lly  to  hope  achieve  is  to  improve  the  present  coordinating  techniques  in  order  to  I 
ma  ~c  them  more  effective. 
simple  decisions  would  help  in  this pracnss. 
A  nu:.~ber  of 
~  ,_  They  include: 
- a  commitment  not  to  use  certain  economic  man~gement  _  mechanisms  ·.d thout  the 
Community's  prior  agreement.  I  am  thinking, 
for  example,  of  the  ir:~port 
deposit  scheme  which  has  been  used  in  Italy; 
- a  more  precise  definition  of  "policy  surveillance" 
firstly,  detailed 
the  examination 
•  which  should  include  ·  • 
prior discussion  on  major  macroeconomic  decisions;  secondly, 
of  policies  on  external  indebtedness  (whose  gro•.-:th  partly 
explains  why  the  EMS  d · t  h  ere  1  mec  anisms  are  little  used);  and,  thirdly, 
critical evaluation  of  the  lt  ·  h  resu  s  aga1nst  t  e  stated objectives,  accompanied 
where  necessary  by  Commission  "recor:1mendations"; 
- the  requirement  that  appropriate  back-u~ measures  be  taken  in  the  event of 
currency adjustments. 
(iii)  By  arranging  the  pound  sterling's full  participation 
Without  sterling's  participation  in  the  exchange  rate  mechanism, 
cannot  be  fully  effective  in  establishing  internal  monetary  stability 
throu1hout  the  Co:.Jr:Ju~ity  an~  in  exercising  its external  influence. 
the  EMS 
The  arguments  advanced  against  such  participation  boil  down  to  its  possible 
impact  on  monetary  policy,  on  the  competitiveness  of United  Kingdom  exports, 
on  sterling's  status as  a  petro-currency  and  on  sterling's  role  as  a  reserve 
currency. 
(a)  On  the  first  point,  the  difficulty  of pursuing  a  monetary  policy  '.•:hi"ch 
incorporates  an  exchange-rate objective,  I  would  first of all  point  out  that 
the  exchange  rate  is  in  fact  already  used  as  an  indicator  in  the  conduct  of 
United  Kingdom  policy;  secondly,  this constraint has  not  prevented  a  country 
such  as  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  from  successfully  pursuing  an 
anti-inflationary policy;  and  thirdly,  the  main  lines of  economic  policy  in 
the  United  Kingdom  and  in  the  EMS  countries  are  currently  broadly  convc rgent 
and  are  likely  to  remain  so  in  the  foreseeable  future. 
.  '·  • (b) 
- 9  -
t  ates  that  it is 
the  Community  experience  demons  r  .  . 
More  generally,  .  exchanqe-r~te obJeCtlves,  providej 
perfectly possible to  pursue Gt  the  same  tlme  . 
.  d  d  domestic  monetary 
that  they  are realistically  deter~lne, an 
objective~ not  to  mention  the  nevertheless  i~portant  .  d 
.  perm,·ts  central  rates  to  be  ad)uste 
fact  that  the  EMS  mechan1sm 
when  necessary. 
of  British exports  I  do  not  The  argument  about  the  ~c~o~m~p~e~t~,~-t~,~·v~e~n~e~s~s~~~~~~~~~~ 
d  f  course  that  as  and  when  pound 
find  convincing.  I  take  for  grante  o 
h  t  parity would  then  be  was  fully  brought  into the  E11S  the exc  ange  ra  e 
·  t  of  the  economic  one  corresponding  to  the  object1ve  parame  ers 
·  Ad  the  figures  I  quoted earlier  show  that  situation  at  that  t1me.  n  , 
l .  ·  ll  def1 "ned  are  easier  to  defend  within  the  exchange  rates  rea  1st1ca  Y 
EMS  than  if  they  are  allowed  to  float,  even  under  control.  Moreover, 
with  42  % of  British exports  now  going  to  the  Community,  compared  to 
33  % a  decade  ago,  the  relevance  of  determinin~ the  pounds'  exchange 
ra~e against  her  EMS  partners  has  increased. 
(c)  Certainly,  the  sterling  exchange  rate  is  influenced  by  the  price  of 
crude  oil, which  directly determines  the  United  Kingdom's  current 
account  balance;  and,  some  of  the  OPEC  countries'  financial  assets 
are  invested  on  the  London  financial  market,  exerting  a  direct  impact 
on  the  United  Kingdom's  capital  account.  It  is equally  certain  that 
if sterling were  a  full  participant  in  the  EMS  an  oil  price  rise  on 
the  scale  of  the  1979-80  increases  could  push  up  the  sterling exchange 
rate  while  depressing  the  other  currencies.  But  we  must  not  forget 
that  the  situation has  eased  on  the  oil  markets  and  that  this  trend 
seems  likely  to  continue.  And  the  EMS  offers  enough  scope  for  stabilizing 
or  adjusting  exchange  rates  that  we  have  good  reason  to  believe  that  the 
system  could  cope  with  the  consequences  for  sterling of  an  abrupt  change 
in  the  price of  crude. 
Cd)  We  come  to  the  argument  that  if sterling  joined  the  exchange  rate  mechanism 
the  EMS  would  include  two  of  today's  four  main  international  reserve 
currencies,  and  this  situation  would  be  bound  to  influence  the  functioning 
of  the  system,  since  a  satisfactory  relationship  would  have  to  be 
maintained  between  the  mark  and  sterling.  Such  problems  do  exist.  But 
the  main  requirement  for  solving  them  is  very  close  coordination  of  monetary 
policies  within  the  Community  and  a  highly  coherent  policy- of  intervention -----------------
- 10  -
in particular  - vis-a-vis  other  countries.  There  is  nothing  new  in  this: 
on  the  contrary,  these  are  the  system's  t  . 
norma  operat1ng  conditions  from 
which  precisely  its full  advantages- coherence  and  stability- are  derived. 
You  must  not  think  that  I  seek  to  underrate  the  problems:  I  do  appreciate 
them,  but  all  in all,  I  feet  that  the  advantages  of  sterling's entry  into 
the  exchange  rate  mechanism  outweigh  the  risks,  which  can  be  contained: 
-for Europe- and  therefore  for  the  United  Kingdom- it will  have  the 
advantage  of  setting  the  seat  on  a  most  necessary  and  most  convincing 
mechanism  promoting  common  discipline, corvergence  in  the  battle 
against  inflation and  consolidation of  the  common  market  in  all  its 
forms; 
-for Europe- and  therefore  for  the  United  Kingdom- it wilt  have  the 
advantage  of  extending  the  only  zone  of  monetary  stability,  relative  though 
it may  be,  in  the  world  today,  and  increasing its size,  its credibility 
and  its negotiating  power  with  the  outside  world; 
- for  the  United  Kingdom,  at  the  present  stage  in  her  adjustment  process, 
it will  have  the  advantage  of  providing  the  additional  asset  of  a 
currency  tied  into a  mechanism  tor stability through  which  exchdnge  rates 
can  mirror,  continuously  andas  closel)l_as  possible,  the  funda~ental  econor.1ic 
realities  relative  to  their  chief  trading  partners,  while  preserving  a 
real  measure  of  flexibility  in  the  system. 
3.2  Strengthening  Europe's  monetary  identity  in  the  world 
Economic  interdependence  has  today  gone  so  far  that  even  the  do~inant  United 
States. economy  does  not  have  complete  economic  soverei1nty. 
In  1955,  the  share  of  exports  in  United  States  GDP  was  under  4.5%;  in  1980  it 
was  over  10%.  It  has  also  been  estimated at  20%  of  US  manufacturing  output. 
so,  what  of the  Community,  which  exports  12%  of  her  GDP  to  non-me~ber countries? - 11  -
Here  we  can  see  the  risks  inherent  in  the  dislocation of  the  international 
monetary  system,  and  the  importance  of  ensuring  that  the dollar  can  perform 
in  normal  conditions  its twin  functions  - as  currency  of  the  United  States  but 
also as  the  principal  international  reserve  and  trading  currency. 
"Organizing  interdependence''  is therefore  a  task  of  the  utmost  importance:  from 
the  moment  that  national  responsibilities  no  longer  have  full  rein,  economic 
management  must  in  part  become  collective,  even  if only  on  a  pragmatic  basis. 
The  immediate  relevance  of  this  question  needs  no  demonstration:  we  only  have  to 
consider  the  influence  of  the  United  States'  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  on 
the  international  economy,  and  the  decline  of  the  economic  and  commercial  function 
of  exchange  rates  (which  is  based  on  economic  fundamentals)  relative to their 
purely  financial  function. 
Of  course,  it is far  more  difficult  to  organize  effective  coordination  with 
economic  powers  outside  the  Community,  one  of  which  is  in  a  dominant  position, 
than  among  the  Ten- and  even  here  we  still have  a  Long  way  to  go.  The  fact 
remains  that  we  cannot  abandon  our  minimum  objective,  which  is  to  ensure  that 
no  major  economic  policy  decisions  likely  to  influence  the  international 
environment  are  taken  until  their external  implications  have  been  evaluated  and 
taken  into account. 
The  need  for  dialogue  is  more  and  more  accepted  - witness  the  summits  of  the 
industrialized  nations,  the  Group  of  Five,  the  Group  of  Ten  and  the  new  interest 
being  shown  in  the  IMF.  Dialogue  in all  its forms  should  be  systematically 
consolidated  and  extended  to: 
- regular  and  detailed discussions  on  the  external  consequences  of  national 
policies; 
- the  role  to  be  played  by  the  instruments  we  have  to  hand  and  the  measures  to 
be  taken  to  ensure  that  the  growth  of  international  indebtedness  is  kept  under 
control; 
- the  desired direction  for  improving  the  international  monetary  system • 
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Progress  is hesitant.  We  in  Europe  are partly  responsible  for  this state of 
affairs  because  of  our  difficulty  in  asserting  our  uni~y and  turnin~ it to 
account,  in  proposing  solutions  and  in  nuttinq  forward  our  view  of  what  the 
international  scene  should  be  like.  Some  of  the  remedies  ~re in our· own  hands. 
I  will  go  even  further  and  say  that  in  our  joint deliberations  on  what  the 
future  holds  we  must  at  some  stage  consider  how  Europe's  monetary  identity  could 
serve  to  impart  a  new  equilibrium  to  the  international  monetary  system  and 
restore  to  us  a  greater  measure  of  self-reliance.  Our  problems  stem  in part 
from  the  fact,  in  itself  a  source of  ton.flict, ,of  a  dominant  reserve  currency 
which  at  the  same  time  is  the  currency  of  the  largest  country.  Can  we  and 
should  we  set  out  on  the  long  road  towards  a  multi-polar  system  which  would 
involve  an  extensive,  not  to  say  radical,  reshaping of  the  present  monetary 
set-up?  No-one  knows  the  answer;  but  considering  the  dangers  of  the  present 
situation,  I  feel  it is  high  time  we  thought  about  it  and  opted  for  an  approach 
that  is  clear  in  its principles  even  if  cautious  in  its practical  tactics  and 
choice  of  path.  An  analysis  of  this  sort  will  of  course  oblige  us  to  look  more 
closely at  the  role  we  would  like  the  ECU  to  play. 
3.3  Strengthening  the  private  and  public  roles  of  the  ECU 
When  the  EMS  was  set  up,  it was  decided  that  the  ECU  was  to  be  at  its centre. 
We  have  not  got  that  far  yet.  Even  so,  after five  years,  the  ECU  is  at  the 
fledgling  stage.  Experience  since  1979  with  public  use  of  the  ECU  is  far  from 
negligible  but  has  remained  strictl~ over-strictly perhaps,  within  the  framework 
fixed  at  the  outset,  even  though  the  ECU  is  beginning  to  be  used  as  the 
counterpart  in  swaps  between  central  banks. 
The  fact  remains  that  the  ECU  is  used  more  as  a  credit  instrument  than  a 
reserve  instrument:  practice  shows  that  the  principal  aim  in  the  management 
of  the  ECU  is  to  restore  status  quo  positions,  that  is  to  say  zero  creditor or 
debtor positions. 
The  reasons  for  the  constraints  on  the  development  of  the  public  role  of  the 
ECU  are  well  known. 
.I. - 13  -
·  d  b  the  price  of  gold  and  the  The  amount  of  ECU  iSsued is  Largely  determ1ne  Y 
·  ·  Ll·m,·ted  to  50%  of  the 
h  rate, .  1 ·ts acceptabil1ty  rema1ns  dollar's exc  ange 
in  the  case  of  net  creditor positions; 
claim;  its convertibility  is  non-existant 
f  Member  States'  discount  rates.  and,  its yield  is  poor  - equal  to  the  average  o 
Should  endeavour,  without  acting  precipitately,  to  I  suggested earlier that  we 
My  philosophy  is  simple:  without  rushing  things,  we  remove  these obstacles. 
·  ·  th  ECU  If  we  can  secure  the  progress  should  pursue  a  policy  of  acclimat1z1ng  e  • 
d  ·  d  L  ·  ,·ts  public  and  private  use  alike,  that  can  be  reasonably  expecte  1n  eve  op1ng 
·d  d  th,·s  ,·s  seen  to  be  useful  and  the  necessary  the  ECU  will  be  in  a  position,  prov1  e 
b.t.  ole  I  often  mention  conditions  and  resolve exist,  to  play  a  more  am  1  10us  r  • 
the  idea  of  an  instrument  "held  in  reserve  for  Europe"  that  may  never  proceed 
beyond  that  stage  but  would  be  available  for  future  use. 
Action  is needed  on  three  fronts 
- the  role  of  the  ECU  in  the  EMS  mechanisms  must  be  consolidated  as  I 
described earlier; 
-the ECU  should  be  increasingly  used,  where  desired,  in  relations  with  central 
banks  in non-member  countries; 
the  private  role  of  the  ECU  must  be  expanded;  this  means  removing  the 
obstacles  that  still prevent  it, despite  its  remarkable  breakthrough,  from 
being  used  more  widely  on  certain financial  markets.  I  have  spoken  of 
foreign-currency  status  for  the  ECU.  Limited  changes  in  the  rules  would 
encourage  a  gradual  expansion  in  its use,  and  this  is  an  ambition  that  forms 
part  of  the  wider  plan  to  create  a  large  European  financial  market  that 
would  be  instrumental  in  regenerating  the  productive  economy. 
3.4  Strengthening  the  process  of  financial  integration  in  the  Community 
The  structural  adjustment  of  the  European  economy,  a  necessary  condition  for 
sustained growth,  demands  a  vast  productive  investment  drive  to  improve 
competitiveness  and  modernize  plant  and  equipment,  which  in  turn  requires  a 
comprehensive  policy attack  in  the  short  and  medium  term.  To  underpin  the 
investment  demand  stemming  from  economic  recovery,  create  a  favourable  legal 
and  tax  environment,  make  sufficient  room  in  the  allocation of  economic 
resources  for  ploughing  back  profits,  and  expand  the  Community's  loan 
resources:  all these objectives  together  make  up  the  basic  frame  for  the 
policy  we  are  advocating  at  national  and  European  Levels. - 14  -
This  is  the  backcloth  to  the  plan  for  a  European  market  oriented more  towards 
the  growth  of  companies'  capital  resources  which  we  have  put  up  to  the  Council 
of  Ministers.  There  is  not  the  same  market  in  Europe  as  in  the  United  states, 
where  savings,  although  less  abundant  are  much  more  widely  used  to  acquire  capital 
holidngs  in  companies.  This  points  up  the  weaknesses  in  the  financial 
structures of  the  European  economies  - apart  from  the  City,  of  course  - and, 
even  more,  shows  how  inadequate  is  the  Community's  financial  integration. 
The  genuine  opening  up  of  a  Large  European  financial  market  would  be  a  powerful 
factor  in  channelling  savings  into capital  investments.  Linking  up  stock 
exchanges,  harmonizing  Legal  mechanisms  and  removing  restrictions on  the  flow 
of  capital  available for  investment  in  the  growth  of  the  European  economy  -
these  would  all  buttress  the  process  of  commercial  integration,  attract  fresh 
resources  into  corporate  financing  and  prompt  the  financial  markets  in  Europe 
to offer  increasingly  sophisticated  and  well-adapted  products  and  services. 
If  it were  decided  to  take  this  step,  as  the  Commission  proposed  last year, 
the  London  market  could  clearly play  a  key  role,  on  account  of  the  quality 
and  range  of  services it is able  to offer and  extensive  adjustment  and 
modernization efforts that  have  been  Launched. 
My  conclusions  to  round  off  this  appraisal  of  the  first  five  years  of  the  EMS 
will  be  brief. 
on  balance  the  experience  has  been  a  positive one,  even  though  the  Community 
is evidently  not  yet  ready  for  a  system  of  fixed  exchange  rates;  the  fact  that 
Member  States  need,  to differing degrees,  to make  successive  Large  adjustments 
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to their  exchange  rates  is  an  indication that  the  basic  conditions  for  the 
transition to  an  irreversible  phase  of  monetary  integration do  not  yet  exist. 
Nevertheless,  several  factors  militate  in  favour  of  a  consolidation  of  the 
system: 
-external monetary  instability is worse  than ever; 
- tangible  progress  has  been  made  in  securing  the  convergence  of  our  economies 
and  must  be  safeguarded  at all costs; 
-experience of  the  system's  operation  has  revealed  areas  in  which  improvements 
could  and  should  be  made. 
Internally,  this  consolidation  should  mean  technical  reinforcement  and 
stronger  convergence,  supported  by  sterling's full  participation  in  the  system, 
and  it should  serve  to enhance  Europe's  monetary  stature  in  the  world.  Finally, 
we  must  ensure  the  expansion  of  both  the  public  and  the private  role  of  the 
ECU  and  speed  up  the  process  of  financial  integration  in  the  Community. 
+ 
+  + 
Any  progress  in  confirming  Europe's  monetary  identity  would  therefore  not  only 
constitute an  essential  political  step  but  would  also  help  us  to  make  the  most 
of  an  asset  that  we  have  underest1"mated  th  ·  - e  cont1nental  scale  of  Europe, 
which  can  also  have  a  monetary  facet. 